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United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
No. 449-September Term, 1974. Decided January 8, 1975
United States of America, ex rel. Julio
JuventinoLujan Petitioner-Appellant, v. Warden Louis
Gengler, et al., Respondents-Appellees
The background of Lujan's petition for Habeas Corpus was an
underworld conspiracy to import massive quantities of heroin into the United
States, leading to indictments and arrest warrants for the defendant Lujan, one
Francisco Toscanino and six other accused persons. The gravamen of Lujan's
appeal was the alleged commission of flagrant irregularities by law enforcement
officers in taking the defendant into custody abroad and returning him for trial
in New York.
EDITOR'S NOTE:

KAUFMAN,

ChiefJudge:

Accepting, as we must for purposes of this appeal, that Lujan's allegations
are true, the arrest warrant was enforced in an unconventional manner. Lujan,
a licensed pilot, was hired in Argentina by one Duran to fly him to Bolivia.
Although Duran represented that he had business to transact there with
American interests in Bolivian mines, he in fact had been hired by American
agents to lure Lujan to Bolivia. When Lujan landed in Bolivia on October 26,
1973, he was promptly taken into custody by Bolivian police who were not acting
at the direction of their own superiors or government, but as paid agents of the
United States. Lujan was not permitted to communicate with the Argentine
embassy, an attorney, or any member of his family.
On the following day the Bolivian police, commanded by Police Major Guido
Lopez, took Lujan from Santa Cruz to La Paz, where he was held until
November 1, 1973. On that date a Lieutenant Terrazas and other Bolivian
police, acting together with American agents, brought Lujan to the airport and
placed him on a plane bound for New York. Upon his arrival at Kennedy
Airport Lujan was formally arrested by federal agents. At no time had he been
formally charged by the Bolivian police, nor had a request for extradition been
made by the United States.
Lujan was arraigned on the day of his arrival, and pleaded not guilty. After
this court's decision in Toscanino, Lujan took steps to challenge the manner in
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which he was brought to the United States. A series of procedural moves
ensued,' but the posture of the case before us is relatively straightforward.
Judge Mishler dismissed without a hearing Lujan's petition for a writ of habeas
corpus on June 21, 1974, and Lujan appeals.
II.
Since Lujan's allegations are to be measured against Toscanino, the facts of
that case must be presented in some detail. Toscanino, an Italian citizen,
alleged that he had been kidnapped from his home in Montevideo, Uruguay,
brought to Brazil, and taken from that country to stand trial in the United
States, all at the illegal instigation of the United States government. The
particular circumstances of the abduction, if Toscanino's claims are true,
represent government conduct appropriately condemned as most inhuman.
Toscanino charged and was prepared to establish that on January 6, 1973, he
and his seven-month pregnant wife had been lured to a deserted area in
Montevideo by seven Uruguayan policemen, acting as paid agents of the United
States government. Toscanino was knocked unconscious with a gun, in full view
of his wife, bound and blindfolded, and thrown into the rear seat of a car.
During a long and circuitous trip to the Brazilian border his abductors dodged
the Uruguayan authorities, and at one point, a gun was placed to Toscanino's
head to compel him to lie quietly while a Uruguayan military convoy passed.
Toscanino was eventually brought to Brasilia, where over a period of
seventeen days he was incessantly subjected to brutal torture and interrogation
by Brazilians acting as agents of the United States government. His captors, he
claimed, denied him sleep and all forms of nourishment for days at a time. He
was fed only intravenously in amounts barely sufficient to keep him alive. He
was compelled to walk up and down a hallway for seven or eight hours at a time,
and when he fell, was kicked and beaten. To induce him to respond to the
interrogation, his fingers were pinched with metal pliers, alcohol was flushed
into his eyes and nose, and other fluids were forced in his anal passage.
Electrodes were attached to his earlobes, toes, and genitals, and electricity was
shot throughout his body, leaving him unconscious for periods of time.
Throughout this period, Toscanino asserted, the United States government
and the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York were aware
of the interrogation and received reports of its progress. Moreover, a member of
the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs of the Department of Justice was
present at times, and actually participated in some of the interrogation.
-At the request of the government, which sought to have the parameters of Toscanino clarified,
Judge Mishler first granted Lujan's motion to dismiss. The government filed notice of appeal on
June 7, 1974. Subsequently, it withdrew its appeal and moved for reinstatement of the indictment.
Judge Mishler then vacated his prior order dismissing the indictment,, and on the same day
dismissed Lujan's petition for habeas corpus.
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Eventually, Toscanino claimed, he was drugged and flown to New York. He
was awakened when the aircraft reached the United States. Upon landing and
while still aboard he was arrested. The district court never held a hearing with
respect to Toscanino's allegations.
On the appeal from his conviction, we held that Toscanino had alleged a
violation of due process which, if proved, would require the district court to
divest itself of jurisdiction over him. Our opinion recognized the traditional
rule, set forth in a line of cases from Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886) to
Frisbiev. Collins, 342 U.S. 179 (1952), declaring that the manner in which a
defendant was brought into the United States did not affect the court's power to
proceed. The Ker-Frisbiedoctrine was rooted in the perception that
due process of law is satisfied when one present in court is convicted of crime after
being fairly apprized of the charges against him and after a fair trial in accordance
with constitutional procedural safeguards. Frisbie, 342 U.S. at 522.
Its effect was to render "police brutality and lawlessness," Toscanino, 50 F.2d
at 272, involved in obtaining jurisdiction over the defendant almost wholly
immune from judicial scrutiny.'
Toscanino viewed the Ker-Fisbiedoctrine, however, as not preventing judicial
scrutiny of conduct of the most outrageous and reprehensible kind of United
States government agents, because of recent pronouncements by the Supreme
Court in the area. Id. at 272-75. Such an approach, Toscanino declared, would
be inconsistent with cases refusing to permit the government to benefit from
illegal police conduct in obtaining evidence, id. at 272, citing Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961), extracting confessions, id., citingMiranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1961), and inducing criminal conduct by the defendant, id., citing
United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 430-31 (1973).
Yet in recognizing that Ker and Frisbieno longer provided a carte blanche
to government agents bringing defendants from abroad to the United States by
the use of torture, brutality and similar outrageous conduct, we did not intend
to suggest that any irregularity in the circumstances of a defendant's arrival in
the jurisdiction would vitiate the proceedings of the criminal court. In holding
that Ker and Frisbie must yield to the extent they were inconsistent with the
Supreme Court's more recent pronouncements, we scarcely could have meant to
eviscerate the Ker-Frisbierule, which the Supreme Court has never felt impelled

'There were limited exceptions to the Ker-Frisbie rule. If the defendant was brought into the
United States under an extradition treaty, the "principle of specialty" decreed that he could be
tried only for the crime for which he was extradited. United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S, 407
(1886) (decided on the same day as Ker). A similar result occurred when the United States had
signed a treaty which imposed a territorial limitation on its own authority. Cook v. United States,
288 U.S. 102 (1933). In addition, those responsible for the abduction might under some
circumstances be extradited for kidnapping, see e.g., Villareal v. Hammond, 74 F.2d 503 (5th
Cir. 1934); Collier v. Vaccaro, 51 F.2d 17 (4th Cir. 1931), and might be liable in a foreign court
for civil damages as well.
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to disavow.' Although we cited other cases in Toscanino as evidence of the
partial erosion of Ker and Frisbie,the twin pillars of our holding were Rochin v.
California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) and dictum in United States v. Russell, 411
U.S. at 431-32, both of which dealt with government conduct of a most
shocking and outrageous character. For example, in Rochin, which Toscanino
described as an illustration of when the Frisbie rule would yield, an emetic
solution was forced through a tube into a defendant's stomach to recover two
morphine capsules which he had swallowed; the capsules were later introduced
at his trial. We quoted at length from Justice Frankfurter's opinion reversing
the conviction because the government conduct had been found to "offend those
canons of decency and fairness which express the notions of justice of
English-speaking peoples," to "shock the conscience," and to "offend a 'sense
of justice.' " 342 U.S. at 172-73. Similarly, we cited Russell for the proposition
that "The force of Rochin continues to be recognized," 500 F.2d at 274, and
noted the Court's warning that
...we may some day be presented with a situation in which the conduct of law
enforcement agents is so outrageous that due process principles would absolutely bar
the government from invoking judicial processes to obtain a conviction ....
411 U.S.
at 431-32.
The cruel, inhuman and outrageous treatment allegedly suffered by
Toscanino brought his case within the Rochin principle 4 and demanded that we
provide him a remedy. Since there was no "fruit" of the abduction which could
be suppressed other than the conviction which ensued, we concluded that the
sole effective remedy was to order Toscanino's release if he proved his
allegations. 500 F.2d at 275.
But the same cannot be said of Lujan. It requires little argument to show that
the government conduct of which he complains pales by comparison with that
alleged by Toscanino. Lacking from Lujan's petition is any allegation of that
complex of shocking governmental conduct sufficient to convert an abduction
which is simply illegal into one which sinks to a violation of due process. Unlike
Toscanino, Lujan does not allege that a gun blow knocked him unconscious
when he was first taken into captivity, nor does he claim that drugs were
administered to subdue him for the flight to the United States. Neither is there
'Indeed, the courts of other circuits have continued to adhere to the Ker-Frisbierule. See, e.g.,
United States v. Herrera, F.2d , No. 74-1831, Slip op. 1440 (5th Cir., Dec. 5, 1974);
United States v. Vicars, 467 F.2d 452 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 967-(973); UnitedStates ex rel. Calhoun v. Twomey, 454 F.2d 326 (7th Cir. 1971); United States v. Sherwood 435
F.2d 867 (10th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 909 (1971); Sewell v. United States, 406 F.2d
1289, 1292-1293 & n.2 (8th Cir. 1969); Brown v. Fogel, 387 F.2d 692, 696 n.7 (4th Cir. 1967);
Tynan
v. Eyman, 371 F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 954 (1968).
4
As the passage from Russell cited in the text indicates, the relevance of the Rochin principle is
not that it provides a test which may easily be applied, see Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954),
but that it embodies a perception which remains viable-a court which would ordinarily stay its
hand will intervene when government conduct becomes so outrageous that conscience and justice
demand a remedy.
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any assertion that the United States Attorney was aware of his abduction, or of
any interrogation. Indeed, Lujan disclaims any acts of torture, terror, or
custodial interrogation of any kind.
In sum, but for the charge that the law was violated during the process of
transporting him to the United States, Lujan charges no deprivation greater
than that which he would have endured through lawful extradition. We scarcely
intend to convey approval of illegal government conduct. But we are forced to
recognize that, absent a set of incidents like that in Toscanino, not every
violation by prosecution or police is so egregious that Rochin and its progeny
requires nullification of the indictment.
Ell.
Nor do we believe that Lujan's allegation that his abduction violated the
charters of the United Nations and the Organization of American States makes
Toscanino applicable to his case. In Toscanino we first emphasized that Ker
and Frisbie had been undermined by recent due process precedents, and in
addition had involved criminal prosecutions by state courts, thus barring the
invocation of the federal judicial supervisory power. We further distinguished
those cases, however, by noting that neither involved a violation of an
international agreement to which the United States was a party. On this
ground, too, we distinguished United States v. Sobell, 244 F.2d 520 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 873 (1957). Sobell, Toscanino pointed out, based his
claim solely on the extradition treaty with Mexico, and it was well-established
that such treaties were not violated by the illegal abduction of a particular
defendant.
We observed, however, that Toscanino's abduction violated the United
Nations Charter, art. 2, para. 4,' and the charter of the Organization of
American States, art. 17,6 both of which proscribed use of force by one state
against the territory of another. As evidence that abductions would contravene
those provisions, Toscanino relied principally on the Eichmann incident, in
which the U.N. Security Council, in response to a formal complaint filed by the
United Nations representative from Argentina, found that Argentinian sovereignty was violated when Israeli and other "volunteers" kidnapped the mass
murderer from Argentina in order to bring him to justice. And, we suggested, a
5

Article 2, paragraph 4 of the United Nations charter provides:
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any manner
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.
'Article 17 of the charter of the Organization of American States provides:
The territory of a State is inviolable; it may not be the object, even temporarily, of military
occupation or of other measures of force taken by another State, directly or indirectly, on any
grounds whatever. No territorial acquisitions or special advantages obtained either by force or
by other means of coercion shall be recognized.
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defendant might be able to interpose the violation of those charters as a defense
to a criminal prosecution.
But unlike Toscanino, Lujan fails to allege that either Argentina or Bolivia in
any way protested or even objected to his abduction. 7 This omission is fatal to
his reliance upon the charters. The provisions in question are designed to
protect the sovereignty of states, and it is plainly the offended states which must
in the first instance determine whether a violation of sovereignty occurred, or
requires redress. H. KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 234 (Tucker
ed. 1966); ALl, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 1, comment f; § 163, comment d (1965). Indeed, even
where a treaty provides certain benefits for nationals of a particular state-such
as fishing rights-it is traditionally held that
any rights arising out of such provisions are, under international law, those of the
states and ... individual rights are only derivative through the states.
Id. § 115, comment e.
Thus, the failure of Bolivia or Argentina to object to Lujan's abduction
would seem to preclude any violation of international law which might otherwise
have occurred. As the comment to Article 16 of the Harvard Research in International Law Draft Extradition Treaty noted:
It only remains to be emphasized that by no means every irregularity in the recovery of
a fugitive from criminal justice is a "recourse to measures in violation of international
law or international convention." If the State in which the fugitive is found acquiesces
or agrees, through its officers or agents, to a surrender accomplished even in the most
informal and expeditious way, there is no element of illegality. 29 AM. J. INT'L LAW
Supp. 631 (1935).
The Rule is not more than a particular application of the general principle that

consent or acquiescence by the offended state waives any right it possessed, and
heals any violation of international law. 1 G. SCHWARZENBERGER, MANUAL
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

162 (4th ed. 1960).

This rule has been expressed in numerous cases. For example, in the
Eichmann trial, to which we referred in Toscanino, the Supreme Court of Israel
permitted the execution to proceed because Argentina, in a joint communiqu6
with Israel, had waived its objections and thereby cured any violation of

M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1110
(1968). Similarly, the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague declined to
international law. 6

order the return to France of Savarkar, an Indian prisoner who had escaped to
'oscanino, by contrast, alleged the following:
In fact, the Uruguayan government claims that it had no prior knowledge of the kidnapping
nor did it consent thereto and had indeed condemned this kind of apprehension as alien to its
laws. 500 F.2d at 270.
We believe that to support this claim, Toscanino would have to prove that the Uruguayan
government registered an official protest with the United States Department of State.
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France from a British ship only to be turned over to British authorities by a
member of the French gendarmerie. The Court of Arbitration held that the
French official's act had vitiated any violation of French sovereignty which
might otherwise have occurred. 2 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL
LAw 319 (1941), citing 1 ScorT, THE HAGUE COURT REPORTS 275 (1916). And
in our recent decision in Fiocconiv. Attorney General of the United States, 462
F.2d 475 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1059 (1972), we held that Italy's
surrender of Fiocconi as a matter of "comity" to permit him to stand trial in the
District of Massachusetts did not prevent the United States from also trying him
for an unrelated but similar offense in the Southern District of New York, since
it was unlikely that Italy would regard the additional trial as a breach of the
terms of the surrender. See also United States ex rel. Connelly v. Mulligan, 76
F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1935); Case of Wilson and McElvery, 4 J. MOORE, DIGEST
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 329 (1906).
Indeed, we recognized in Toscanino that abduction from another country
violates international law only when the offended state objects to the conduct.
There, we distinguished United States v. Cotten, 471 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1973)
as a case in which a forcible abduction violated no international law since the
defendants had been voluntarily turned over to United States representatives
by the Vietnamese authorities.
We do not have to decide here whether, in the absence of a claim of torture or
of similar reprehensible conduct, the violation of international law alone would
require dismissal of an indictment. We hold only that given Lujan's failure to
allege that Argentina or Bolivia protested his abduction or that the abduction
involved abuse of the type we condemned in Toscanino, there is no justification
for ordering the district court to divest itself of jurisdiction over him. 8
Affirmed.'

'We note that Lujan was taken into custody only after an arrest warrant was issued. Since,
therefore, there was probable cause for Lujan's arrest, and since the failure of Argentina or
Bolivia to object suggests that they would have been receptive to Lujan's extradition, we decline to
adopt to this case the extreme remedy of requiring dismissal of the indictment. For unlike the
exclusionary rule which prohibits use of illegally obtained evidence or confessions, adoption of an
exclusionary rule here would confer a total immunity to criminal prosecution. Moreover, the
controls which otherwise exist to prevent illegal abductions-the financial cost of the operation,
the possibility of alienating other nations, and the risk that the kidnappers would be prosecuted in
a foreign territory for their offense-suggest that the likelihood of numerous violations is not
real. If this assumption should, in the future, prove to be ill-founded, our conclusion can be
reconsidered. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 650-53 (1961) overruling Wolf v. Colorado, 338
U.S. 25 (1949).
'Because we held for other reasons that it does not control this case, we find it unnecessary to
decide whether Toscanino should be given retroactive effect. The issues are, of course,
interrelated, for whether a decision is retroactive depends in part on its rationale, the extent to
which it overturned prior law, and the breadth of its effect. See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293
(1967). Accordingly, we were first required to consider the scope of the holding in Toscanino, and
our views on that point, standing alone, require affirmance.
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